The institutional development of Russia:transition to contractual razdatok

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The article presents key provisions of the integral-institutional paradigm, which is a new tool for analyzing institutional development. In the new paradigm, the market and razdatok (nonmarket economies) are viewed as universal development mechanisms. As a result of institutional evolution, during which the razdatok and the market improved their forms, a new reality is being formed in the 21st century, which is no longer in opposition to market and razdatok economies, but in their integration. Integration of the market and razdatok leads to the formation of either a quasi-market model or a contractual razdatok. The key properties of these basic institutional models of the 21st century are analyzed. The quasi-market is the reason for the rent-oriented motivation and stagnation of the economy, while the contractual razdatok is a new universal model leading to dynamic growth. The main result of the paradigm is the justification of the possibility of Russia's transition to the open access social order.

Keywords:
integral institutional paradigm, open access social order, quasi-market, contractual razdatok



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