On D. Dennett and His Patterns: R. Rorty, M. Devitt, and Realism

The paper aims to analyze potential arguments that D. Ross and J. Ladyman could apply for the justification of the realist status of Ross’ theory of existence. This theory is based on the Dennetian real patterns conception, which in turn uses a number of antirealist assumptions (like Fine’s NOA and Davidson’s semantics without reference) and allows a holistic interpretation (R. Rorty). Our prime premise is the existence of several stages in the philosophy of science development, «before» and «after» the elimination of «false dichotomies» with the Quinean naturalization project as a milestone. The transition to Ross’ theory of existence does not mean the weakening of the requirements of objectivity in comparison with the standards of the «classical stage» of the scientific realism development (G. Maxwell, R. Boyd, J. Smart), as the theory does not presuppose the primacy of the «dichotomies» (such as «theoretical–empirical», «abstracta–illata», etc.).

Keywords: pattern, projectability, dichotomy, naturalization, D. Dennett, R. Rorty, M. Devitt, D. Ross.