Dennett and Scientific Realism: Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Argument from Error

The paper aims to show that the interpretation of D. Dennett’s concept of real patterns as a fundamental concept of existence makes it possible to offer a new conception of the development of scientific knowledge containing: (a) L. Laudan’s conclusion that the real history of science contradicts the idea of convergence of scientific theories, and (b) the problem of pessimistic meta-induction will not be decisive in refuting scientific realism for a given historical period of time. Within the framework of the accepted ontology, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction is presented as one of the variants of the skeptical argument – argument from error, and the notion of «projectivity in respect to a given physically possible perspective» (D. Ross) fully reveals the notion of «additional information» that a «new» theory should have over the «old one», in order to refute the skeptic's reasoning.