The Sceptical Problem Is a Pseudo-Problem. Open Lecture: Does theExternal World Exist? Part II. The Sceptical Scenario Is Meaningless

Duncan Pritchard's hinge-disjunctivist approach is not purely therapeutic, it represents a significant step forward. But, within it, the nature of the hinge propositions themselves is not fully disclosed. We interpret the hinge propositions as reality-rooted Wittgenstein rules. This allows us to strengthen the joint interpre­tation of the sceptical paradox. Finally, we express our doubts about the need for a disjunctivist compo­nent to solve/dissolve the sceptical problem. A sceptical scenario is meaningless, because any understand­ing involves the use of concepts, which, in turn, make sense only if they are rooted in reality. Our point of view is consistent with Jocelyn Benoist's contextual realism, as well as with Robert Brandom's position, ac­cording to which rationalists and materialistic reductionists share a common false semantic premise about the possibility of a clear separation and independent treatment of semantics and epistemology.

Keywords: scepticism, hinge propositions, epistemological disjunctivism, biscopic approach, knowledge first episte­mology, contextual realism.